21/01/2003 - The Island
Touching-up the picture





A highly reputed pedagogue of a bygone era in Ceylon had a pithy saying which he often used on his pupils: the first time might be an accident, the second time could be a coincidence, but the third time is a damn fact. The Prime Minister's 'Peace Process' has long since passed through the first and second stages, and is now indisputably into its third stage. The distinctive aspects of this particular 'fact' are:

I. the putting in place, under the rubric of re-settlement and re-construction, of the socio-economic framework of a separate Tamil state under the LTTE's exclusive control,

II. the unilateral disempowerment of the Sri Lankan Security Forces in the Peninsula especially, under the rubric of re-settlement in High Security Zones established by the SL/SF to protect themselves against the LTTE and, thereby, ensure that the writ of the state runs there,

III. mobilising the support of the so-called international community to that end, so that their recognition of the new state, when appropriate, is no more than a formality, and

IV. thus obviating any need to go before Parliament and people (2/3rds majority plus referendum) for a federal constitutional arrangement, which would be a nullity under UDI.

There are a few points in this picture which require a little touching-up. The role of the US: the role of India: the role of Japan. Norway needs no special mention - just CEO of the enterprise will suffice.

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Writing in The Island just under six months ago (27 July 2002), I had suggested two reasons for particular US interest in brokering a 'done deal' here between Ranil Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran, which would give the US a defining presence and role here in the long term.

(a) it would provide an ideal diplomatic/political staging post for the world's sole hyper-power to exercise its watching brief over South Asia especially (but also South-East Asia), where the preponderant regional power, India, and its principal challenger, Pakistan, both possess nuclear weapons, and

(b) it would provide an ideal naval/maritime staging post for the extended US naval reach in the entire Indian Ocean, Gulf region.

India and Pakistan have the added value of being the US opening to the oil and gas-rich Central Asian region, especially if the imminent attempt at regime change in Iraq throws up any unexpected problems in respect of Arabian Gulf oil reserves. It was therefore with considerable interest that I read a piece carried in the Daily Mirror of Thursday 09 January, from Rahul Bedi of Inter Press News Service, titled "US sets sights on Lankan port". My interest was reinforced by the prompt rebuttal from the Indian High Commission here, carried by the Mirror the very next day. Bedi's main points, in briefest summary, were as follows:

1. The US sees India now as a strategic ally, whilst India sees the US as her most coveted ally.

II. The US eyes Trincomalee as a staging point for her expanding naval influence, and for containing China's proliferating sway, in the Indian Ocean.

III. To that end, the US has persuaded India to step in as her "proxy", and moved to neutralise the LTTE through the PM's 'peace process'.

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IV. The means to the end has been the IOC-CPC joint venture, both over the Trinco oil tank farm facility, as well as the petroleum distributive deal. The IHC denial took the predictable line: Bedi's story was "highly speculative and factually incorrect", whilst the IOC-CPC joint venture was purely bilateral, and not at the behest or on behalf of any third party. What was noteworthy was its speed. It also acquires added interest because of another news report.

The Sunday Observer of 12 January carries on its front page, a report from Ananth Palakidnar (no dateline), which states that:

Milinda Moragoda has briefed former Indian Deputy Chief of Staff Major Gen Satish Nambiar on the HSZ issue in the North, and has sought his assistance to help re-structure those HSZs in line with an agreement to do so, with the LTTE. Gen Nambiar is expected here in early February for discussions and ground inspections with both the SL Army and the LTTE. He will submit his report to the PM, thereafter.

Now, it is inconceivable that any retired Indian General would enter upon such a venture without the prior agreement, and 'instructions' of the incumbent Government. Since it is the GOSL's purpose somehow or other to dismantle those HSZs before the 'peace process' comes unstuck, one assumes that Gen Nambiar has the Indian Government's concurrence to help the GOSL to do so.

Of course, it goes without saying that it is for the SLA (Army) alone, and nobody else - not even their Commander-in-Chief, to determine the disposition and nature of those HSZs, for it is the SLA which has to carry the can for the military-political consequences of their dismantling. An Indian or any other kind of General would, besides other considerations, gain most valuable insights into the deployment, preparedness and morale of the SLA through such a study as envisaged for Gen Nambiar by Minister Moragoda. We can then only guess at who else stands to benefit from that knowledge, thereafter.

So, if the news report in question is true, it follows that, notwithstanding the political-military baggage which an Indian Government, even if not one of Congress I affiliation, might carry from the 'past' (Accord, IPKF-LTTE war, Rajiv Gandhi killing, etc), it is now prepared to enter upon the most crucial transaction of the Ranilian peace process - the unilateral military disempowerment of the SLA, which alone would really clear the deck for Eelam UDI.

And Japan? Impeccable credentials as Sri Lanka's major aid donor, the US global strategic ally, a plausible 'cover' for India tacitly to accept as a key player in the peace game here, equally good diversion for the LTTE from an otherwise awkward Indian connection. The Tokyo aid meeting will presumably herald the last Act of this vulgar theatrical production. Anyone for drinks, during the interval?