September 17th was J. R. Jayewardene’s birthday, which provides a good opportunity to glance once again at his legacy. Though 97 is not a particularly important anniversary, it makes sense to explore precisely what that was, and where it has led us. Not only did JR clearly exercise great influence over Ranil in his formative years, we have to deal too with what seems the current determination to continue in JR’s line. That might be termed the urban elitist tradition of the UNP, in contrast to the more people oriented approaches of the Senanayakes and in particular Premadasa.


In one respect, it should be granted, Ranil is an improvement on JR. In the drawing rooms of Colombo J R is credited with having opened up the economy. But it is a sad fact that, at the end of his tenure of office, a larger proportion of the economy was in state hands than had been the case under Mrs. Bandaranaike’s more aggressively statist dispensation. It was Premadasa who commenced privatization, as with the plantations, and ensured competition, as in abolishing the outrageous Celltel monopoly J R had granted. That process, despite practical deficiencies in various aspects, was not really reversed by either Chandrika or Ranil.


The problem here lies rather in Ranil’s failure to understand the need for state intervention during this process, not in terms of blanket controls, but through ensuring a level playing field. This requires the expansion of opportunities rather than handouts, and pluralism with regard to training instead of statist uniformity. The younger people in his cabinet seem to recognize this, but his gross neglect of education suggests ignorance of the contemporary world. Instead he still seems stuck in the communitarian dreams of the past, pursuing his grotesque vision of a Youth Corps, a vision not generally shared by liberal democratic countries whatever Hitler or Stalin might have thought.

Absolute power The penchant for absolute power of course derives direct from J R. The 19th amendment was modelled on the 2nd amendment that allowed dissidents from the TULF to join the government while preventing UNP members from even expressing doubts. And with the ill thought out 1978 Constitution now serving another President (who, fortunately for Ranil, does not seem aware of how powerful the position is constitutionally), he has decided that democracy is a drag, and South Korean or Indonesian military dictators far better role models.


But there was another aspect to JR’s authoritarianism which I fear Ranil may well try to replicate. In that earlier period, the rivalry between what might be termed the competent second rank was intense, with both Lalith and Gamini, as well as Premadasa, hoping to inherit the throne.


Shades of the first two can be discerned in Ravi Karunanayake and Milinda Moragoda, both immensely bright and modern in their outlook. Whether Ranil is fuelling what seems rivalry between them is not clear but, if history is anything to go by, he could well believe this to be a priority.


Indeed Ranil seems to have done better than JR in keeping the two youngsters under control, which is understandable in view of their relative ages.


J R clearly would not have felt threatened himself, but Ranil could well worry about being outshone. Hence perhaps the failure to give them cabinet status immediately, hence the fairly limited areas in which they can function, as opposed to the empires Lalith and Gamini had from the start. And this is the sadder in that Ranil clearly has far fewer competent persons in his cabinet than J R had.


So, while I have to confess I never had much respect for Shahul Hameed, who politicized diplomatic appointments at all levels and presided over the decline of relations with India, he seems an intellectual and administrative giant in comparison with Tyronne Fernando. Similarly, when J R realized Nissanka Wijeyeratne was making a hash of education despite his intellectual credentials, he replaced him with Ranil who proved an admirable Minister.


Ranil, though freely admitting education is now in total chaos, cannot or will not do anything about it.

And where JR had the immensely capable Ronnie de Mel at Finance, Ranil has put Choksy, with his most trusted ally Chari to really call the shots. Not content with that, he has Paskaralingam there as well, leading to a situation where some Ministers feel nothing can be done with Chari, whereas Paski’s blessing will ensure action. But with Paski no longer young, and having to be away at times, hiatus inevitably occurs.


With all this duplication in the areas that Ranil thinks matter, others are grossly neglected. In that respect certainly his mentor, perhaps because he did not suffer from the same insecurities, was better able to ensure action on a larger scale. Premadasa’s Housing and Village Reawakening Programmes, Lalith’s restructuring of the Port and Shipping and the impetus he gave to Trade, Gamini’s efficient quick delivery of Mahaweli outputs, have no parallel in the present situation.


And if JR too failed to ensure adequate input into the North and East, with the need much more urgent now, Ranil’s failure to do anything is more culpable. The opportunity he had at the beginning of 2002 was squandered, with his appointment of Bradman Weerakoon instead of a more robust creature like Chari, Jayalath Jayawardene instead of a results oriented politician like Ravi or Milinda or Karu Jayasuriya or Gamini Jayawickrema Perera.


But this I suppose is the crucial difference between them. Ranil is deeply insecure, an insecurity fuelled by what the party he had served so loyally, if blindly, did to him in 1994, exacerbated by the warnings he received early in 2001. Tall poppies have to be cut down and since, unlike J R, his stature was low to begin with, others have to bow very low indeed. Unfortunately, largely I think because of innate decency, no one in the UNP will challenge him.

And at the slightest hint of dissension, there are loyalists like Olitha Premaratne and Mahinda Ratnatilleke who will jump to his defence. That he needs such reassurances is the strongest evidence of his truly sad plight.


Unfortunately Prabhakaran is made of sterner stuff than the UNP. So, when Ranil tried the same technique, of straitjacketing him within SIRHAN, with the assurance from donors that they would not grant funds except through the government of Sri Lanka, Prabhakaran put his foot down. Indeed, in a brilliant manoeuvre, he benefits both ways.


TRO, which he basically runs, gets a fair amount of funding while he can legitimately express indignation and demand an interim administration because of the failure of current rehabilitation structures.


Sinhalese opposition That demand, for which he had good reason, has now been coupled with insistence on police and other powers. I have no doubt Ranil will feel obliged to grant them. For, like JR who struggled so hard to alienate India and then avoid granting devolution on a small scale, only to give up everything in 1987, Ranil too will scamper for cover when the big guns threaten. JR in 1987 had upset the Sinhalese opposition, the Sri Lankan Tamils and India. Giving India what it wanted was the least threatening option as far as his own authoritarian regime was concerned. So he gave in, and then used Indian troops to attack the Sri Lankan Tamils which released his own troops to attack the Sinhalese opposition.


I don’t really think Ranil is so bad. His misdemeanours are on a small scale, in comparison with JR’s excesses. But, having alienated the Sinhalese opposition, and feeling threatened by more capable people in his own party, he is obliged to yield to the Tigers. Eelam, I presume, is not so very worrying after all to the urban elite - or at any rate not until it moves to annexe Diyatalawa and perhaps Nuwara Eliya too.