Ending weeks of negative speculation, the Government and the LTTE have decided to hold direct and official political talks in mid-September in Thailand.  The positive impact of this development was immediately felt in Colombo when the government managed to restore some measure of political stability by neutralizing the PA’s alleged move to breakup the UNF alliance.  Incidentally, political stability or instability in Colombo is now largely contingent on the success of the government’s political engagement with the LTTE.

Meanwhile, the intensity of the divisive debate on the agenda of Bangkok talks has also diminished, indicating a certain stabilization of the political process towards government-LTTE talks.  The initial stage of the debate was marked by negative predictions and deep pessimism expressed by the PA-JVP led opposition coalition as well as the liberal human rights establishment.  Issues like the interim administration vs. ‘core issues’, democracy vs. totalitarian peace, and pluralism vs. LTTE hegemony dominated the agenda of the debate on the peace process for months.  At times it appeared that the government and the LTTE were about to move along different directions.  However, the Oslo meeting between Minister Moragoda and Dr. Balasingham became instrumental in bringing about a quick and positive shift in the overall political atmosphere in Colombo.

In retrospect, the harsh debate on the peace process was a useful one in the sense that it gave an opportunity for all the opponents as well as skeptics of the Government-LTTE truce and talks to articulate their positions.  Some of the criticism appears to have impacted on the LTTE’s behaviour, particularly concerning the recruitment of child soldiers, taxation and Tamil-Muslim relations in the Eastern province.  Subjected to the critical scrutiny in the public space, the LTTE, under conditions of the ceasefire, is beginning to acquire a political character as well.

De-proscription is most likely to strengthen the possibilities for the LTTE’s transformation into a key political actor in Sri Lanka.

Meanwhile, the oft-repeated negative arguments about the ‘folly of peace’ have now lost the sting.

The political atmosphere in Colombo is slowly settling down in favour of the peace process and a negotiated settlement.

The situation in the Eastern Province is also largely stabilized, although it continues to have a character of fragility and unpredictability.  It seems that the Government, the LTTE and the SLMC have learned useful lessons from the flare-up there.  However, it must be mentioned, at least in passing, that any spoiler element that seeks to scuttle the September talks might view the Eastern Province as the most favorable flash point.

Meanwhile, assuming that the UNF-PA conflict does not explode in the coming weeks, the Government should have the necessary breathing space to concentrate on the agenda and substance of negotiation with the LTTE.

Against this backdrop, certain aspects of conflict negotiation in general need to be reviewed in order to appreciate the complex possibilities inherent in the forthcoming negotiation process.  Talks in Thailand will certainly mark a qualitative shift in Sri Lanka’s peace initiative.

When two sides that have been engaged in a war for nearly two decades begin negotiation, it amounts to moving away from projects of unilateral outcomes and a concomitant shift towards joint outcomes.

The fundamental difference between the war and negotiation is that the strategy of war is built on seeking a unilateral way out from the conflict whereas the negotiation process is built on the assumption that unilateral outcomes are no longer viable and joint ones are both feasible and possible.  What is quite interesting in the present conjuncture of Government-LTTE political engagement is that both sides are indicating a willingness to shift their strategic behaviour from war to accommodation.  This suggests an emerging framework of bilaterality the continuation of which is crucial for the talks in Thailand.

As both the Government and the LTTE appear to have realized, their meeting in Thailand would be only the beginning of a long-term process of negotiation.  These talks, contrary to the way many critics of the present peaces process seem to have assumed, cannot, and shouldn’t, be a one-off affair.  The proposed September meeting  can very well be just a preliminary engagement across the table.  A major breakthrough is hardly possible in the first round of talks.  Signs at present suggest that both sides will demonstrate a studied measure of flexibility towards each other’s concerns.

It is quite interesting to note that months of negative attacks made by critics on their engagement have compelled both the Government and the LTTE to take steps towards further consolidating the negotiation process.  The fact that the two sides are not insisting on rigid and unilateral agendas is worth taking note of.  For the talks to progress, it would be better to keep the negotiation agenda for the first meeting somewhat flexible and relatively open.

In engaging counter-state secessionist movements in negotiation, governments have greater responsibility to protect and strengthen the negotiation option and create conditions for its sustainability.  To apply this general principle to Sri Lanka, we need to recognize the fact that the LTTE has inaugurated a political track parallel to its military track.  The latter was opened up by the LTTE soon after it acquired a status of unassailability, the so-called status of military parity, vis a vis the Sri Lankan state.  Merely because it entered the political track, the LTTE will not let its military track weakened.  It will always keep its military options open, in order to be able to return to the military strategy in case the political track collapses.

The responsibility for the continuation or collapse of the political track to which the LTTE has entered on its own terms has, in the present conjuncture of Sri Lanka’s conflict, effectively moved away from the LTTE.

That responsibility now rests firmly and squarely with the UNF Government and the political  forces in Sinhalese society.  In case the LTTE begins to realize that the Sinhalese political forces are not yet ready to do serious political business with them, they might even consider the option of returning to the other track.  Indeed, negotiation with the LTTE itself is serious business.

This calls for the UNF Government to insulate its strategizing of the negotiation trajectory from the propagandist demands made by the oppositionist distracters in Colombo.

This perhaps is where a brief discussion of the issue of the LTTE de-proscription might make sense.  It is reported that the Government is considering the lifting of the ban ten days before the scheduled date of talks in Thailand.   The primary reason that the Government should lift the ban on the LTTE without delay is that it has the immediate potential of strengthening the LTTE’s own political track.

As long  as it remains banned, the LTTE has no space to engage in political activities outside the areas of their direct or indirect control.  If the Government is seriously committed to  a negotiated political settlement with the LTTE, then the Government ought to allow the LTTE to engage in political, as opposed to military, activities.  Continuing proscription will merely promote and encourage the LTTE’s military track, because the message it gives to the LTTE is that the Government continues to treat it as an illegal, terrorist and illegitimate entity.

Legality and legitimacy are conditions necessary for the LTTE’s continuing engagement with the mainstream, parliamentary politics.  In this sense, the Government should not view the issue of de-proscription as a bargaining chip in forthcoming talks.  Rather, the most prudent approach would be to view it as an effective political measure that will sooner than later contribute to strengthening the LTTE’s parallel political track.

Once de-proscribed, the LTTE is most likely to have a variety of political options to pursue.
 
That might include the opening up of political offices in Colombo, engagement with the political parties other than those with the UNF, interaction with the Colombo media and, of course, a dialogue with the Sinhalese political constituencies as well as the masses.

Such opening up of political space for the LTTE is, of course, a political gamble.  But it is worth taking, because only a good measure of perestroika of the LTTE, facilitated and propelled forward by the Sinhala polity’s openness, would make accommodation and settlement possible, feasible and durable.