The past two years saw a refreshingly new approach to our foreign policy. This was more the product of the situation the country faced. The peace process had its own dynamic.

Though the Minister of Foreign Affairs was Mr. Tyronne Fernando who was the designated Foreign Minister, Minister Moragoda who was working with the PM crafted the support policy for the peace process.

A journey into our past in the area of our foreign relations is necessary and relevant in order to appreciate the significant departure from the past.

Sri Lanka has in many ways laboured to adopt a zero-sum approach in our foreign policy in the past. Since independence we have had a "pendulum" foreign policy that swung from one ideological bloc to the other as the leaderships changed. It was a policy of gaining favour with one at the expense of the other.

As a result of the cold-war, foreign policy became a process of aligning oneself with one or the other ideological bloc. The bipolar world during the cold-war defined foreign policy as an alignment with the ideologies of the super-powers, a zero-sum effect. It was an adversarial approach where an iron-curtain ensured a clear division in the world orders. In most cases foreign policy represented a process of leaders gaining favour with one ideological bloc to up their stature.

Sri Lanka, though a non-aligned nation, did not escape the global doctrines of foreign policy at the time, having to translate the global trends into a regional context. We also followed the zero-sum approach in foreign policy at certain times.

In the 1960s, the government of Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike, found friends with the socialist bloc. Sri Lanka was seen to be influential among the socialist states, with Mrs. Bandaranaike having played a leading role in forging an end to the Indo-China war in 1962.

The close relations with the socialist bloc and compatible foreign policies gained significant favour with India. In 1964 Sri Lanka was able to convince the Indian government to accept over half-a-million Indian migrant workers under the Sirima-Shasthri Pact. India also withdrew its claim to Katchchativu.

However, during this period Sri Lanka had completely alienated the West. In 1962, the government nationalized the assets of American oil companies and failed to pay compensation. Subsequently, US applied the Hicken-Looper Amendment to suspend aid to Sri Lanka.

The zero-sum approach to foreign policy at the time was a policy of alignment with the socialist bloc, a policy that brought Sri Lanka closer to India, and with it, certain achievements in the national interest as the government of the day perceived our national interest to be.

In 1977, the newly elected President Jayewardene reached out to the West in keeping with the liberal economic policies of his government. The zero-sum approach continued, this time with a pro-western policy. This was defiant of the Indira Doctrine which placed a role for India in what was considered the Indian sphere of influence.

As a consequences of the Jayewardene policies the Tamil militant movement received Indian patronage. This was up to the Indian incursion into Sri Lankan air-space and the food-drop over Jaffna in 1987 and the subsequent Indo-Lanka accord, which circumscribed our sovereignty.

The period of President Premadasa was blotted with callous remarks about the Indian leadership and the demand for the withdrawal of the IPKF.

The Indian policy towards Sri Lanka had also gone through several phases after 1977, from a policy of interference and intervention, to a policy of involvement, to a policy of complete disinterest.

In the mid 1990s, with the government of President Kumaratunga, relations improved with India but India continued the policy of disinterest in Sri Lanka. On the world stage, Sri Lanka with Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar was spearheading a single-handed campaign against terrorism.

The recommencement of Eelam War III, and the escalation of the conflict, saw the international community distancing themselves from Sri Lanka. In 2000, when the Jaffna peninsula was under siege by the LTTE, it was evident that friends of Sri Lanka were scarce. Even India merely offered ships to evacuate our troops; it was Pakistan that came to our rescue by sending us multi-barrel rocket launchers that helped to beat back the LTTE.

In the recent years, several factors changed the dynamics that have an impact on South Asian policy. The Manmohan Singh factor which changed the economic profile of India was irreversible. The infusion of IT expertise from the Indian diaspora transformed places like Bangalore into the Silicon Valley of Asia. India found that liberal economic policies and closer relations with the US were not in conflict with the interest of India.

The declaration of nuclear status by both India and Pakistan, also created a desperation in the West to deal with these to states. The military coup in Pakistan led by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999, followed by the Kargil misadventures, made India look the more responsible ally in the region.

The Sri Lankan peace process which began in 2002 was set in a period where US-Indian relations were at an all time high. Stepping away from the usual approach of aligning Sri Lankan foreign policy with one influence or the other, the ‘Moragoda Doctrine’ not presumptuously but rather aptly in many respects, defined a policy in which the global super-power and the regional power were positively engaged in the peace process and in the best interest of the country. It was a combination of policy and personal relationships that was instrumental in guiding such a partnership forward.

The approach was not to achieve a zero-sum effect as in the past, not to win favour with one and alienate the other. It was providing opportunities for regional and global influences to have a stake in the success of the peace process. There was no doubt, that the peace process required the endorsement of India and support of the international community if it was to succeed. If either of the two factors faltered it would have impacted negatively on the path to peace.

The Sri Lankan peace process was viewed internationally as a viable initiative because the regional power and the global super-power were committed to its success. The pledges made at the Tokyo Donor Conference were a further endorsement of the expectations placed by the international community on this process.

The Moragoda Doctrine or shall we say ‘approach’ had successfully steered a path in which regional and global interest were not undermined in the peace process. It provided space for the protagonist to negotiate a settlement with a clear understanding of the expectations by the regional and world community.