A delegation from India is visiting this country to finalize the long awaited Defence Cooperation Agreement; we hope that it would be an agreement which has not only substance but fills that all important vacuum in our national security. What it should not be is an agreement, which covers already existing arrangements. The DCA must send out a signal to the LTTE, if otherwise it would be a waste of time.

The LTTE vehemently opposed the Indian Oil Corporation being given the Oil Tank complex in Trincomalee and there were very important members of the former government who had reservations, stating that we were sending a wrong signal to the LTTE and jeopardizing their `EBsacred`ED peace process but thanks to renewed Indian interest (after 1987) and the persistence of a member of the former cabinet, the deal went through and the LTTE were compelled to reconcile themselves to it. The presence of the IOC in Trinco; its expanded interests in Sri Lanka is in a sense an insurance policy against the LTTE. The other initiative of the previous administration was the Defence Cooperation Agreement, which was also opposed by the LTTE and the same group who claimed to be owners of the peace process in the previous administration. They kept looking over their shoulder at the LTTE --- not only because they feared that the LTTE would make it an issue to pull out of the talks (the LTTE pulled out for much less when it suited them though they hugged and kissed after Hakone) but because they feared assassination at the hands of the LTTE if they crossed them.

The Defence Cooperation Agreement, an initiative particularly pushed by former Minister Moragoda, is now on the verge of becoming a reality. If it is properly crafted it would send the best possible message to the LTTE to fall in line and agree to a settlement based on the Oslo Accords. The LTTE only understands one language `F1and that is not the language of appeasement `F1which was the language in which certain members of the former administration spoke to the LTTE. The LTTE has no respect for the weak and vacillating appeasers, they respect only the strong. They read appeasement as a sign of weakness.

There were fears that the new government after it sent a delegation to India immediately it came to office to discuss the DFA had also been infected by the UNP bug `EChow will it impact on the sacred peace process`EE. This was because of the unexplained delay to conclude the DFA. The Indians would no doubt have had to factor in the opposition from the DMK but in India most fortunately national interest supersedes parochial interests.

We were indeed hopeful after the initial visit of the new government`EDs delegation to India for discussions on regional security that a Defence Co-operation Agreement would be concluded at the earliest. That visit indicated a continuation of Defence and Foreign policy, which is vital for this country. Some detractors have commented that the PA has stolen the UNF`EDs clothes but this is not correct. The PA and the SLFP have always wanted the closest of relations with India.

The citizenry of the country would no doubt be pleased that this initiative is at long last about to come to fruition. The President should have included a nominee of the UNP on that first delegation to flag the fact that when it comes to national security, it is a bipartisan policy that this country follows---is this too much to ask of our politicians? In the same spirit that motivated the establishment of the National Peace Council the President should invite, even at this late stage, a representative from the UNP to be a part of the national delegation to the talks. This would show the world that we could be responsible people.

Our relations with India saw a significant change after 1994. Credit should be given to President Chandrika Kumaratunga and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lakshman Kadirgamar for having reached out to mend fences and restore the relationship to what it had been during the period of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike. After the Government of Mr. Ranil Wickramasinghe took over, he and Minister Moragoda further strengthened this relationship. They had, fortunately for this country, cultivated close personal relations with the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee when he was in the opposition. During Mr. Wickramasinghe`EDs administration we saw a quantum leap in relations not only with Delhi but also with Tamil Nadu. No previous leader reached out to the South. This is a fact that must be flagged. I do hope the present leadership would also cultivate close personal relations with their counterparts in India.

It was President Kumaratunga, who launched the Free Trade Agreement with India. Though many had reservations and fears about the outcome of that Agreement it has worked out well for us. The Wickramasinghe administration has taken Economic Cooperation to new heights by extending the Free Trade concept from Goods to Services and Investment. A major achievement indeed. It was also the Wickramasinghe administration with Minister Moragoda doing the legwork that was able to lure the Indians into taking over the Trincomalee oil tank complex. They have increased their investment in this country by taking over and improving more than a hundred filling stations. Indian investment in this country today surpasses all others.

Military co-operation has been in existence for quite sometime and the Indians have been helping us with training in particular. The now pass`C8 Letters that were exchanged between President Jayewardena and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi included clauses relating to defence cooperation. That Agreement is `EBpasse`ED because both sides have been in default, having observed it in the breach. The world has also moved on and Indian foreign policy has also changed since the days when certain Indian hegemonists sought to Bhutanize this country by circumscribing our sovereignty.

Co-operation in the Defence field had increased significantly during the Wickramasinghe administration, which perceived of a new Defence Co-operation Agreement as a vital element in the peace process itself. The unfurling of a strategic umbrella over Sri Lanka was a vital element of the Wickramasinghe administration`EDs strategy. It is no secret that Prime Minister Wickremasinghe the Defence Cooperation Agreement was an instrument to check LTTE`EDs ambitions. But in this regard it must once again be stated that the PM seemed cautious as to how the LTTE would react to such an Agreement. I come to this conclusion on the basis of the time spent without movement on this and also perhaps the fact that the LTTE sympathizers in the `EBhouse`ED may have asked him to proceed cautiously. But why should the then Prime Minister have had to look over his shoulder to see how the LTTE would react, for the LTTE had done him no favours? They have on the contrary only embarrassed him by their actions, which have resulted in the Defence portfolio being taken away and finally his administration being toppled.

It would be recalled that former Minister Moragoda held discussions with Minister Fernandes who agreed to visit this country in October last year. Unfortunately commitments at home prevented his visit. But it is of significance to note that the Indian side have extended a special courtesy to our delegation which visited immediately after the new government came into office, by arranging for a meeting of the Minister of Defence for our Defence Secretary and other officials. This indicates a certain positive commitment on the part of India.

Whilst, we have been co-operating more or less on the periphery, it is now the time to broaden and deepen the security relationships for, as stated by Minister Fernandes himself, the security of India and the security of Sri Lanka are one. If an Agreement were concluded it would be the first with a SAARC country and could be the beginning of a new regional security arrangement which would be first step towards holistic regional integration which is the logical extension of the concept the Indian PM referred to at the SAARC summit.

The issue now is the model of the Agreement we should have? A mere `EBStatement of Intent`ED, a routine loose Agreement setting out inter alia the cooperation forms which already exists with what some prefer to call `EBan enabling clause`ED will not suffice to meet the needs or threats facing either country. Considering the nature of the threat we face nothing short of a Defence Pact which would include a long year lease of the Trincomalee Harbour, with co-rights for the Sri Lanka Navy would serve our needs and theirs. India could set up a regional Naval training centre at Trinco too, and last but not least use the Palaly Air Base. Any Agreement would need to cover all three branches of the military, the Army, Navy and the Air Force and also Intelligence but as to whether there is the political will in India to take on a responsibility for the defence of the region and in the process of our unity and territorial integrity would be the issue. This must certainly be more than a `EBCross Services`ED Agreement as some have suggested. An important matter that must be taken into consideration is the expanded sea arm of the LTTE`F3The Sea Tigers and their sea suicide squads and the threat to shipping and the security of the region.

India must take into consideration her role as the Region`EDs Superpower and the responsibility that goes with that status and her ambition to sit at the `EBHigh Table at the UN. India`EDs interest would also be her own security, to ensure that no threat to her unity could emanate through and from the South. The rise of linguistic nationalism and inspired terrorism would be India`EDs main concerns, for they would give a fillip to the already smouldering fissiparous tendencies manifest in a number of insurgencies of varying intensity in India.

Another interesting and important aspect of regional security is the new relationship between India and the United States. They are in the process of developing a close security relationship. The sea lanes to and from the middle east to Japan, Korea and China pass by our waters and any third rogue `EBNavy`ED such as the Sea Tigers, would constitute a huge threat to such shipping and regional security. Yet another aspect which would be of concern to India and the United States is a possibility of the LTTE not only selling its technology but also its arms to insurgent groups in India and beyond.

If an Agreement materializes the implementation of such an Agreement has to be carefully managed. The Agreement must create a permanent `EBJoint Commission`ED, which would supervise and ensure its implementation. Sri Lanka should have the strongest possible Defence Cooperation Agreements with India; it is in our mutual interest.